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The American economic system allows a freedom for individual 
initiative that is probably unmatched in the world. Perhaps 
only in the United States could a boy leave formal education at 
the eighth grade, enter business for himself, and six years later 
at the age of twenty be earning a monthly salary of $2,000 as an 
electronics consultant. This is how the sixty-two year old 
William P. Lear, Sr. began a career as inventor and manufacturer 
of industrial electronic components. 
As president and principal owner of Lear Jet Corporation, 
he continues to depart from long-accepted industrial maxims in 
the development of new products. His latest is a jet aircraft 
designed for corporate executives. Mr. Lear believed that 
executives utilize aircraft primarily to reduce travel time, and 
hence, do not require the large, luxurious walk-around passenger 
cabins that are common in competitive models. He incorporated 
this utilitarian concept into the design of the Lear Jet 23, and 
achieved speed and safety plus the utility and economy of a 
small aircraft. 
Mr. Lear invested $10,600,000 of his money in the corpora- 
tion; and prior to the public stock offering on November 30, 1964, 
he owned 100% of the common stock. A single owner-manager 
speeded development of the corporation because important deci- 
sions could be made quickly without time consuming management 
conferences. As Mr. Lear said, "I would hold a Board of 
Directors' meeting every five minutes and the decisions were 
always unanimous." 
OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
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The purpose of this study was to compile and present a 
business history of the Lear Jet Corporation. Results of the 
study furnished answers to the following questions: How has 
complete ownership and management by one man (to November 30, 
1964), affected the development of Lear Jet Corporation? Why 
did the sixty-two year old William P. Lear, Sr. risk his 
$10,600,000 fortune to develop the Lear Jet 23 aircraft? Has 
the evolution of Lear Jet Corporation been unique in the air- 
craft industry? Were the Corporation's design and marketing 
policies unusual in the aircraft industry? 
In a study of this type, no definite conclusions are 
offered. However, the concluding section contains some personal 
observations and potential problems within the Lear Jet Cor- 
poration. 
The material on which this study was based was obtained 
from Lear Jet Corporation records and interviews with represen- 
tatives of management, designers, production specialists and 
customers. 
HISTORY 
In 1930 William P. Lear, Sr. founded Lear Corporation to 
produce electronic instruments which he had designed and 
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patented. The company grew rapidly, and played an important 
part in developing electronic instruments for aircraft during 
World War II. Following the Korean War, Lear Corporation estab- 
lished manufacturing facilities in Europe. Mr. Lear decided to 
direct this foreign expansion program himself by moving to St. 
Gallen, Switzerland. 
In November 1959, Lear decided to design and produce a 
small executive jet aircraft for market primarily in the United 
States. Although no executive jets had been produced by 1959, 
he believed a market existed for this type of aircraft, and was 
intent upon assembling the men and materials necessary for its 
development. In April 1960, Lear incorporated the Swiss Amer- 
ican Aviation Corporation in the state of Delaware, with prin- 
cipal offices in St. Gallen, Switzerland. 
While in search of engineering talent, Mr. Lear met Dr. Hans 
L. Studer, the chief aircraft design engineer for the jet- 
powered Swiss P-16 fighter-bomber project. Lear told Studer of 
his intentions to develop an aircraft unlike any on the market 
at that time. The general specifications included the following: 
an executive jet aircraft; eight-passenger capacity; high-speed 
performance; and a total gross weight of less than 12,500 pounds. 
Dr Studer'was interested in the project and agreed to work 
with Lear. They started preliminary design studies, but could 
not decide on one that satisfied the stringent requirements 
established. Lear learned from Studer of the engineering re- 
finements built into the supersonic ground-support fighter- 
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bomber (P-16) that was sponsored by the Swiss government. Three 
aircraft were tested extensively to determine capability as a 
possible addition to the Swiss Air Force. However, the P-16 
project did not meet with full approval of the Swiss government, 
and was abandoned. None the less, Lear recognized the fine 
aerodynamic qualities and structural integrity of the P-16, and 
believed this design could be modified into his executive jet 
aircraft. Several major changes were necessary, however. The 
P-16 weighed 24,000 pounds (almost twice the desired 12,500 
pounds), and it was designed to carry armaments. Lear's design 
eliminated all armaments and required less aircraft structure, 
thus allowing considerable reduction in weight. 
Lear succeeded in hiring several of the engineers who had 
worked with Dr. Studer in designing the P-16. Thus he was able 
to acquire much of the P-16 technical data including wind tunnel 
tests. As a result, considerable time and money were saved in 
modifying the design into a passenger carrying aircraft. Time 
was of utmost importance because Lear believed that he could 
gain a market advantage if he were one of the first manufacturers 
to produce a small jet aircraft built exclusively for the civil- 
ian market. 
Lear wanted his design to exceed all requirements. Many 
problems arose that required changes in the P-16 design, all of 
which L as sole financier, personally authorized. Frequently 
the engineers would discuss design problems with Lear; and sub- 
sequently he would often devise solutions that were simpler or 
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lighter in weight than the solutions developed by the engineers. 
After the design was completed during the summer of 1961, prep- 
arations were begun for tooling-up to produce the aircraft. 
A "name" was selected for the aircraft, the SAAC-23, which 
was derived from the company abbreviation and the twenty-three 
designs that were studied before a final selection was made. 
Lear had set January 1, 1962 as the date for roll-out of 
the first completed aircraft. But by November of 1961, it was 
evident that this goal would not be achieved. The principal 
problem was an inability to obtain qualified employees. Very 
little unemployment existed in Switzerland. Furthermore, it 
was necessary that any employee (regardless of where hired), 
sign a contract which prevented him from leaving that job before 
the terms specified in the contract were fulfilled. This pre- 
vented Mr. Lear from hiring trained employees-under-contract 
away from other companies in Switzerland. 
Many other problems existed. Employees refused to work on 
Saturday or Sunday, or to work overtime regardless of the wage 
bonus offered. Also, the Swiss celebrated approximately forty 
national holidays annually. The result was an average work 
week of four days. 
Labor and material costs were rising. Between November 
1959 and November 1961, labor costs increased nineteen precent. 
Raw material prices were fluctuating to the extent that suppliers 
refused to set a definite price on their products prior to 
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delivery. This meant that a manufacturer had no way of knowing 
the cost of material purchased for future production. 
Another problem entailed the acquisition of United States 
Federal Aviation Agency certification, which permits a manu- 
facturer to sell a passenger or cargo aircraft in the United 
States. The F.A.A. refused to certify the SAAC-23 aircraft in 
Switzerland because of the cost of operating a certification 
program outside of the United States. Finally, Lear decided to 
take the aircraft and test equipment to the United States in 
order to get F.A.A. certification. 
Relocation 
Confronted with a multitude of problems and realizing that 
production was far behind schedule, Lear decided to review his 
aircraft development program. He knew many problems such as 
hiring trained employees and obtaining F.A.A. certification 
would not exist if production were located in the United States. 
Several alternative solutions were considered; but in July 1962 
he decided to move production tooling and materials from St. 
Gallen, Switzerland to Wichita, Kansas. 
Several locations were considered in the United States. 
Many cities offered to provide production facilities or favorable 
tax moratoria, but Wichita was selected because of the avail- 
ability of engineers and skilled aircraft workers. In the 
summer of 1962, Wichita experienced a serious unemployment 
situation that was caused by the release of several hundred 
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aircraft workers from Boeing Airplane Company's Wichita plant. 
With many skilled employees and cooperative city officials, Mr. 
Lear believed that Wichita was the best location for his new 
plant. 
In August 1962, the city of Wichita agreed to lease a sixty- 
four acre tract of land adjacent to the municipal airport, and 
to construct a taxiway leading to the main runway. Also the 
city of Wichita constructed a building providing 96,000 square 
feet of floor space that was financed by a $1.2-million revenue 
bond issue. The entire issue was purchased by the Lear family. 
By January 1, 1963 the plant facilities were ready for occupancy. 
During the construction program, designs and equipment in 
Switzerland were being prepared for shipment to Wichita. Lear 
hired Henry Waring and nine other engineers from the Wichita 
area to study the designs and tooling in Switzerland before they 
were dismantled. All Swiss operations ceased in September 1962 
and five hundred tons of equipment were shipped to Wichita at a 
cost of $85,000. 
Lear had planned to employ several Swiss technicians, but 
only one engineer, a technical interpreter, agreed to move. All 
others, including Dr. Studer, declined his offer. 
The technical staff, numbering approximately seventy, began 
receiving shipments on January 15, 1963. Despite a delay caused 
by the dock workers strike on the eastern coast of the United 
States, all shipments were received by March 1, 1963. The plant 
then was ready to begin production of its first aircraft. 
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On April 1, 1963, Lear amended the Delaware incorporation 
papers of the Swiss American Aviation Corporation to change the 
company's name to Lear Jet Corporation. Also, the aircraft was 
designated the Lear Jet 23. 
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 
The organization structure of the Lear Jet Corporation orig- 
inated with Mr. William P. Lear. As both founder and financier, 
he held final authority for all decisions throughout the crucial 
aircraft development period. His immediate subordinates assumed 
the role of advisors without decision-making authority. Lear's 
refusal to delegate authority kept him well informed of the status 
of operations, although it caused many probelms when he was 
absent. Lear would not delegate authority to anyone until he 
was assured that the subordinate would react to the problem in 
the same manner as he would. He wanted his organization to think 
as he did, even in his absence. 
Mr. Lear experienced an unusual and challenging life. His 
importance to the development of the Lear Jet Corporation cannot 
be over-estimated. His experience in the electronic and avia- 
tion industries was a major factor contributing to the company's 
development. A brief vignette of his personal history follows. 
In 1916, after completing the eighth grade, Lear began his 
career by starting a small radio repair shop in the suburbs of 
Chicago. At seventeen he enlisted in the Navy and became a 
radio ref-lirman. Three years later, in 1922, he founded the 
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Quincy Radio Laboratory at r,unicy, Illinois. His duties with 
that company were primarily research and consulting. In 1926, 
he was employed by Radio Coil and Wire Company and Galvin Manu- 
facturing Company of Chicago to develop the first all-band radio 
coil, and was subsequently awarded a United States patent for 
his design. 
In 1930, he founded and became president of Lear Develop- 
ments, later known as Lear Incorporated. His first successful 
product was a radio receiver for aircraft. He had learned to 
flv and had purchased a small airplane which he used to test the 
radio receiver. He called his radio receiver the Lear Radioaire. 
Over 300 of these were produced and sold to the Stinson Company, 
an aircraft manufacturer. 
Lear continued his inventions in the aircraft communication 
and navigation field, and manufactured them in his company, Lear 
Incorporated. During World War II, he was credited with devel- 
oping the auto-pilot systems that were used on many of the allied 
bombers. For this outstanding achievement he was awarded the 
Collier Trophy by the President of the United States in 1950. 
Lear's many other awards include the following: 
The Frank M. Hawks Award for the design of 
the Learmatic Navigator in 1940. 
The Horatio Alger Award in 1954. 
Sweden's Thulin Medal in 1960 for tributions 
to the aircraft industry. 
The Great Silver Medal by the City of Paris 
for his aid in developing the auto-pilot 
for the Caravelle jetliner in 1962. 
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Honorary degree of Doctor of Engineering from 
the University of Michigan in 1951. 
The organization structure of the Lear Jet Corporation as 
of December 31, 1964 is presented in Exhibit 1. The Board of 
Directors included the following: 
William P. Lear, Sr., Chairman of the Board, 
President and Chief Executive Officer. 
Moya Olsen Lear, the wife of William P. Lear, Sr., 
Vice President and Director. 
Fran D. Jabara, Dean and Professor of Accounting, 
College of Business Administration, Wichita 
State University. 
Harold R. Boyer, retired in early 1964 as a 
Vice-President of General Motors Corporation 
after three decades of service. 
A. Gilmore Flues, Washington, D. C., attorney 
and former Assistant Secretary of 
United States Treasury. 
Elroy McCaw, president of several radio and 
television stations, and active in numerous 
business interests. 
Daniel I. Sargent, Vice-President and Director 
of Philadelphia and Reading Corporation, 
formerly President of Huston Chemical Corp. 
David Van Alstyne, Jr., senior partner of the 
investment firm Van Alstyne, Noel and 
Company, New York City. 
Lear Jet Corporation's top-management group included nine 
men in addition to Mr. Lear. Mr. William A. Sipprell, Vice- 
President and General Manager, was responsible for all company 
activities. He was formerly President of Babb Company, manu- 
facturers of aircraft components. 
John A. Caves, Treasurer, was responsible for all financial 






BOARD or DIRLCIO...0 "----1 EXECUTIVE COMMA I rEl 
PRESIDENT 
AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
OFFICER 
William P. Lear 
TREASURER 
J. A. Caves 
AIRCRAFT 
DIVISION 




















William A. Sipprell 
SECRETARY 























P. Pottro C.Bromlcy 
SEALING ASSEMBLY 
L. 

























C. W. Nanney 
INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS 





















































































Young Spring and Wire Company, and Haskin and Sells in Los Angeles. 
Philip A. Golde, Secretary, formerly served as Senior Vice- 
President, Secretary and General Counsel of Lear Incorporated, 
Santa Monica, California. 
C. W. Nanney, Executive Assistant, joined Mr. Lear in 1959, 
following retirement from the Los Angeles Police Department. 
Mr. Nanney had been with the Lear Jet program from the beginning 
in St. Gallen, Switzerland. 
W. W. Landers, General Manager of the Aircraft Division, was 
formerly Vice-President of Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corpor- 
ation, and associated with the Electric Boat Division of General 
Dynamics. 
Samuel H. Auls, General Manager of the Industrial Division, 
was formerly Engineering Supervisor for Lear Incorporated, Santa 
Monica, California. Mr. Auld had worked closely with Mr. Lear 
in developing the auto-pilot for the Caravelle Jetliner. 
James R. Greenwood, Public Relations Director, was formerly 
Manager of Press Relations for Beech Aircraft Corporation. 
E. C. Mandenberg, Director of Material, was formerly associ- 
ated with Martin Marietta Corporation as Manager of Material. 
Kenneth 2errell, Manager of Industrial Relations, previously 
served twelve years as Industrial Relations Administrator for 
Beech Aircraft Corporation. 
These men constituted a management committee; with Mr. 
Sio.prell as chairman, that met each' Wednesday morning to 
facilitate intra-management communication. 
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FINANCE 
Mr. Lear was the first man to develop and certify a jet 
aircraft entirely from Private capital. As of November 30, 1964, 
he had invested $10,600,000 in the company, and with his wife 
owned 100% of the outstanding capital stock. 
On April 29, 1960, Mr. Lear issued himself 1,000 shares of 
common stock for a total cash investment of $100,000. During 
the ensuing period to July 1, 1964, Lear issued himself an 
additional 49,000 shares of common stock for cancellation of in- 
debtedness owed by the company to Lear on loans (representing 
principal plus accrued interest), totaling $4,900,000. 
The Certificate of Incorporation of the company was amended 
on July 27, 194 to increase the authorized capital stock to 
3,000,000 shares of one dollar par value per share. On July 29, 
1964, the 50,000 shares of $100 par value common stock owned by 
Mr. and Mrs. Lear were exchanged for 1,500,000 shares of the 
new common stock of one dollar par value per share. Of the paid- 
in surplus, $3,500,000 resulted from the purchase of the above 
shares by Mr. and Mrs. Lear, all but $308,131.79 was applied to 
cancel the deficit in retained earnings of the company as of 
July 31, 1964. (Exhibit 2.) This deficit had arisen principally 
from a charge of $3,192,510.51 because research and development 
costs to April 30, 1964 were not available to the company as 
deductions for income tax purposes. The stockholders, i.e., 
Mr. and Mrs. Lear, had elected Sub-chapter S of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954, thereby permitting the stockholders to 
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offset a company tax loss against personal income. This tax 
loss included gross research and development costs, net of taxes, 
which had been used as tax deductions in the year in which such 
exoenditures were made. None of the loss that was incurred in 
company operations prior to April 30, 1964 was available to the 
Company for decreasing future taxable income. 
On October 1, 1964, the Certificate of Incorporation was 
further amended to increase the authorized capital stock to 
4,000,000 shares of par value one dollar. Also, on this date 
the Board of Directors authorized the issuance of six percent 
convertible debentures due in 1969 in the amount of $4,000,000. 
Mr. Lear immediately cancelled debts totaling $4,000,000 owed 
to him by the company in exchange for convertible debentures 
which were convertible after November 30, 1934 into common stock 
of the company at a price of eleven dollars per share. 
Funds for construction of additional plant facilities to 
increase floor space to 220,000 square feet were provided by the 
city of Wichita through the sale of a $1,250,000 industrial 
revenue bond issue. 
The entire plant was owned by the city of Wichita and leased 
to the company under terms of a contract terminating on October 
31,1983. The comoany had an option to buy the plant and equip- 
ment covered by the lease at its termination for $5,000. 
With the production of the Lear Jet 23 increasing, and the 
Industrial Division expanding (see p. 20), the company was in 
need of additiona_L capital. On November 30, 1964, Lear Jet 
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Corporation offered the first public stock issue of 500,000 new 
shares of common stock. The stock was offered to the public at 
a price of ten dollars, with a net proceed to the company of 
$9.00 per share. The new stock issue was sold within a one-week 
Period; and as of December 31, 1964, the stock had maintained a 
price averaging $9.60 with light trading activity. The proceeds 
from the stock sale were to be used to pay a six percent bank 
loan of $510,000 due on December 20, 1964, and to pay $1,500,000 
in acounts payable to material suppliers. The remainder was 
be used for procuring additional tooling and equipment for in- 
creasing production of the Lear Jet 23, and to produce a sub- 
stantial volume of Lear Stero units. (See Production, p. 21.) 
Mr. Lear had stated, "A total capitalization of $20,000,000 
would be required to sustain production of eight to ten aircraft 
per month and 1,000 Lear Stereo units per day." However, he did 
not think that the company would have another public stock 
offering in the foreseeable future. 
ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT 
The major portion of engineering effort in Lear Jet was 
directed toward development of the Lear Jet 23. The original 
design was completed by the Swiss engineers whose primary effort 
went into redesigning the Swiss P-16 to meet the specifications 
of an eight passenger jet transport. The Swiss engineers were 
trained in precision designing and had little regard for the 
mass production techniques utilize in the United States. 
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However, they failed to appreciate the greater efficiency of 
the average worker in the United States compared to a Swiss 
worker. 
After the move to Wichita, the design was translated into 
the English language. Then the Lear engineers modified the 
design to reduce production costs, but maintained industrial 
standards of quality. Also, the production jigs were "opened-up" 
by removing unnecessary structure to allow more working space 
around the jigs. 
Specifications called for an aircraft with maximum gross 
weight of 12,500 pounds. In order to achieve this goal, it was 
necessary to shave weight from every possible component. The 
total weight for the design was approximately 500 pounds above 
the limit. Lear decided the only solution was to develop his own 
"avionics" (electronic flight control instruments), with emphasis 
on minimum weight and space requirements. Thus the Industrial 
Division developed from a need for component parts with special 
weight and space requirements. 
Lear had developed the F-5A auto-pilot during World War II 
for use on American military aircraft. Also, he had developed 
the auto-pilot for the French-built Caravelle airliner with 
complete automatic landing capability. Lear knew from past 
experience that it was possible to develop a complete integrated 
flight control system for the Lear Jet 23. By utilizing inte- 
grated systems, many duplicate components could be eliminated. 
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Lear assumed the role of an advisor to his engineering team. 
He set the standards, made suggestions and the final decisions. 
The complete aircraft design was re-evaluated with emphasis 
on reducing excess weight. Considerable weight reduction was 
achieved by redesigning components, thus eliminating unnecessary 
material. As an example, the instrument panel was re-manufac- 
tured from lighter weight materials. After the removal of all 
excess weight from the aircraft, and the installation of the new 
lightweight flight control system, the all-important goal of 
12,500 pounds was achieved. 
The flight control system contained the Lear three-axis 
auto-pilot with automatic landing capability. This device 
enables a pilot to land at an airport with zero visibility in 
the following way. The pilot intercepts a radio beam which gives 
altitude, cistance, and azimuth from the runway. The auto-pilot 
then "locks-on" the beam and follows it throughout the approach 
and landing without the necessity of the pilot seeing the runway. 
This system has pro7en to be reliable and has been evaluated by 
United Air Lines for possible use in regularly scheduled service. 
In May, 1963 a major problem arose in the design. Wind 
tunnel tests performed on a one-fifth scale model of the Lear 
Jet 23 showed that at high speeds, (approximately 690 : :ales per 
hour), the horizontal stabilizer and elevator control surfaces 
cn the tail lost their aerodynamic effectivoess. This phenom- 
enon caused the nose of the aircraft to drop, resulting in an 
uncontrolled dive. Although the aircraft was not designed to 
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fly faster than 620 miles per hour, it was conceivable that a 
pilot could accidently exceed this speed. 
The original tail was fitted with the horizontal stabilizer 
located behind the twin jet engines. In order to improve control 
effectiveness, the tail was redesigned with the horizontal 
stabilizer located on top of the vertical stabilizer, (Exhibit 6). 
Although this change created a two percent increase in drag, the 
control problem was eliminated. 
First Flight 
In September, 1963 the first aircraft was rolled out, seven 
months after production began. Test pilots Bob Hagan and Hank 
Beaird had studied the design and operating specifications from 
the start of production, and were prepared to start flight test- 
ing. The first aircraft, licensed as N8O1L, was ready for flight 
testing on October 7, 1963. That day the Lear Jet 23 success- 
fully completed its first flight of twenty-five minutes, during 
which it was climbed to 10,000 feet and obtained a speed of 250 
miles per hour. By February 1, 1964, the N801L had completed 
its eightieth flight and had 100 hours total flying time with no 
inflight emergencies. On March 5, 1964 the second Lear Jet flew 
with a veteran pilot at the controls, Mr. William P. Lear, Sr. 
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Certification Program 
On Apri11,1964 the Federal Aviation Agency issued an inspec- 
tion authorization which marked the formal beginning of type 
certification for the Lear Jet 23. A certification program is 
conducted by the Federal Aviation Agency to insure that the air- 
craft meets all requirements prior to being used in public or 
private transportation. 
Two aircraft were used in the certification program. 
Recording eauipment was mounted in the passenger cabins for .post- 
flight evaluation. A Lear pilot and a Federal Aviation Agency 
pilot conducted each test fi ht. 
On June 4, 1964, Lear Jet N801L was destroyed by fire fol- 
lowing an emergency landing in a wheat field approximately two 
miles southeast of Wichita's Municipal Airport. Federal Aviation 
Agency test pilot, Don Keubler, pilot in command, and co-pilot 
James Kirkpatrick of Lear Jet Corporation were performing a series 
of single engine take-offs with the aircraft loaded at maximum 
gross weight. On one such take-off, the .wing spoilers were in- 
advertently left in the extended position from the previous 
landing. The aircraft reached an altitude of seventy feet before 
it was landed gearup in an open field. It skidded approximately 
1500 feet before coming to a stop in an upright position with 
only minor damage to the lower fuselage and wing surfaces. Un- 
fortunately, a ruptured fuel tank was ignited and the aircraft 
was consumed by fire before fire fighters could reach the scene. 
The two pilots escaped without injuries. The Civil Aeronautics 
20 
Board investigation showed the cause of the accident to be a 
pilot error in attempting a take-off with the wing spoilers in 
the extended position. 1 
The accident resulted in a six-week delay in the certifica- 
tion program, in addition to total loss of an aircraft and test 
equipment. However, the accident demonstrated the strength of 
the Lear Jet 23's structure because the entire aircraft remained 
intact through the crash landing. 
The certification program continued without incident 
utilizing the remaining aircraft. On July 31, 1964 the Federal 
Aviation Agency announced that the Lear Jet 23 complied with all 
requirements, and issued type certificate number A5CE. 
Industrial Division 
The Industrial Division developed several electronic pro- 
ducts from the knowledge gained in the aircraft development pro- 
gram. A static inverter with no moving parts, was developed for 
transforming DC electrical power into 400 cycle AC power. Many 
competitive models had a rotating disk which increased noise 
and weight. 
The most important development was the compact stereo-radio 
unit which was designed to fit into the standard General Motors 
auto radio compartment. The stereo unit operated from an endless 
tape (encased in a small cartridge), inserted into the front of 
the unit. In addition, the stereo unit Contained an AM radio 
1. Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 8, 1964, p. 25. 
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without push-button controls. The automobile stereo unit had 
four speakers, two installed in the lower front side panels 
ahead of the doors, and two above and behind the rear seat. 
The unit was adaptable to boats and airplanes, and was 
fitted with a cabinet for the home. All stereo models will 
utilize a standard tape cartridge containing one hour and twenty 
minutes of programming. 
PRODUCTION 
The Lear Jet has been unique in the aircraft industry 
because the first aircraft was built from production tooling. 
It had been customary to "hand-build" a prototype for testing 
prior to investing large sums of money in tooling. However, 
Lear believed his design was satsifactory, and by omitting the 
prototype, saved several months in attaining full production. 
The Lear Jet 23 was produced from a single assembly line 
at.the Wichita plant. On December 31, 1964 production was 
averaging three aircraft per month. Plans were to increase the 
rate to ten per month by June 1, 1965. 
The Industrial Division realigned production facilities 
in anticipation of a stereo production rate of 1,000 units per 
day. However, this was not expected to occur until the 1967 
car models went into production. One hundred stereo units 
were installed in Ford, General Motors and Chrylser cars for 
testing and evaluation by the automobile manufacturers. If 
their estimates were valid, stereos would be installed on ten 
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percent of the 1966 and twenty-five percent of the 1967 car 
models. 
Lear had obtained patents on important design features and 
appeared to have the most compact unit on the market. As a 
result, Lear was in a position to obtain a large volume of the 
auto stereo market--as of December 31, 1964, estimated in excess 
of one million units per year. If this market developed, Lear 
was prepared to grant manufacturing rights on a royalty basis to 
other companies to produce Lear Stereos. 
MARKETING 
The Aircraft and Industrial Divisions each had separate 
marketing departments. The Aircraft marketing department was 
responsible for promotions and sale of the Lear Jet 23. It 
concentrated on fulfilling the demand for high speed executive 
transportation. The trend toward corporate mergers and diver- 
sification resulted in executives spending a greater proportion 
of their time in travel. A majority of their travel was on the 
major airlines. However, executives frequently were forced to 
use slower means of transportation to reach locations not served 
by an airline resulting in time lost from the job. This situ- 
ation created a demand for a corporate aircraft capable of oper- 
ating from small airports at jet airliner speeds, and was the 
market for which the Lear Jet 23 was designed. Furthermore, the 
Lear Jet 23 was priced below all competitive models and was 
better suited to the smaller corporations' budget. (Exhibit 3.) 
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The Lear Jet 23 design was based on Mr. Lear's concept 
that executives utilized an aircraft for high speed transpor- 
tation, and that they do not require large luxurious interiors. 
The Lear Jet 23 provided "limosine comforts," while competitors 
furnished "pullman-car accommodations." The resulting difference 
in weight was reflected in the economy and performance of the 
Lear Jet 23. 
Lear expected to obtain twenty-five percent of the cor- 
porate market, with projected sales of 600 aircraft over the 
next five years, exclusive of potential military sales. Air 
Force officials in Washington requested a demonstration of the 
aircraft's capability as a logistics-support aircraft. And 
although, Lear did not expect to create a major military market, 
an office for government coordination was established in 
Washington, D. C. 
On August 1, 1964 the company franchised six domestic and 
four export distributors to handle all retail sales (except 
government purchases), of the Lear Jet 23. (Exhibit 7.) The 
distributors were large independent aircraft delaser respected 
in the aviation industry. Each distributor was assigned a 
geographic region that was allocated on the basis of sales 
potential. They were required to provide adequate sales and 
service facilities to accommodate all Lear customers in their 
respective region. In return they received a five percent 
discount from the retail sale price. 
The marketing department vigorously promoted the Lear Jet 23 
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through the entire development and certification program. The 
first cutomer delivery was made on October 13, 1964 to the 
Chemical and Industrial CorporatiOn in Cincinnati, Ohio. 
Initial sales were made directly to the customer by Lear Jet 
Corporation. 
The Lear Jet 23 was priced at $595,000. Each order 
required a non-refundable cash deposit of $50,000 at the time 
the order was received. As of December 31, 1964, Lear Jet 
Corporation had received firm orders for eighty-nine aircraft 
at a sale value of $52,955,000. 
Customer response was so intense that individual distri- 
butors could not be furnished an aircraft for demonstration 
purposes. To solve this problem, Lear Jet Corporation delivered 
aircraft to customers with an agreement that the aircraft could 
be returned to Lear Jet Corporation for demonstration purposes. 
However, the company was planning to provide each distributor 
with a "demonstrator" by March, 1965. 
The Lear Jet was the lowest priced executive jet on the 
market. (Exhibit 3.) In comparison with competitive models, 
it had the highest thrust-weight ratio--a ratio that reflects a 
greater efficiency of operation. The nearest competitors are 
the Jet Commander and the DeHavillana DH-125. However, the 
Lear Jet was priced far below either model and had performance 
features which exceeded all competitors. The most important 
feature of the Lear Jet was that it was the only executive jet 
aircrLZt licensed below 12,500 pounds maximum gross weight. 
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This allowed the Lear Jet to be licensed under the same regu- 
lations as any light aircraft, thus considerably reducing the 
restrictuions placed on its operation. Also, it could be used 
for commercial air taxi operations without the requirement for 
a commercial air carrier permit. This permit is required of all 
commercial aircraft weighing in excess of 12,500 pounds, and 
includes the same rigid regulations imposed on the commercial 
airliners. Thus, the Lear Jet was the only passenger jet on the 
market which qualified for air taxi certification. 
Lear Stereo 
The Industrial Division developed a stereo unit designed 
for use in automobiles, aircraft, boats, and console models 
for the home. The outstanding feature of the Lear Stereo was 
its compact size in comparison to competitive models. It was 
combined with an AM radio and would fit into a standard auto- 
mobile radio compartment. (Exhibit 8.) 
The Lear Stereo appeared to have a considerable marketing 
advantage over competitive models. One advantage was that the 
unit operated from an endless tape enclosed in a standard size 
300 cartridge. (Exhibit 8.) The cartridge could be changed by 
merely pulling it out and reinserting another. 
In order to promote sales of the Lear Stereo, the company 
contracted with the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) to pro- 
vide the taped music. The major automobile manufacturers were 
then contacted and given a demonstration. They showed enthusiasm 
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toward the Lear design, and agreed to purchase one hundred units 
for testing and evaluation. These units were sold for $250 each. 
However, it was anticipated that the price would decline to $125 
per unit when production increased. Mr. Paul Momenteller, 
marketing director for the Industrial Division stated, "We would 
never have sold a test unit if we had not previously contracted 
a major recording company to furnish the music." 
As of December 31, 1964 the company was in contract nego- 
tiations with General Motors, Ford and Chysler to produce 
Lear Stereos for the 1966 and 1967 automobile market. 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
After the move to Wichita, the company began hiring skilled 
aircraft production workers in the Wichita area. A majority of 
them had worked for Boeing Airplane Company, a manufacturer of 
heavy military and commercial transport aircraft. The Boeing 
Company decreased employment in mid-1962 that caused a serious 
unemployment problem in the city. This supply of unemployed 
skilled workers was the main factor in Mr. Lear's decision to 
move to Wichita. 
But hiring workers temporarily unemployed from other manu- 
facturers resulted in a problem of excessive employee turnover. 
This was caused by many employees returning to their original 
jobs when recalled by their former employers. However, the 
company succeeded in maintaining a full work force without pro- 
viding an employee training program. On December 31, 1964 the 
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company employed 1,300 individuals of which 1,100 were in the 
Aircraft Division and 200 in the Industrial Division. 
The international Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO was 
elected by the employees as their collective bargaining unit on 
July 8, 1964. Of the 1,300 employees at 1964 year-end only 800 
factory employees were eligible for affiliation with this union. 
As of December 31, 1964 the union organization was still in 
process and no union-management contracts were being negoatiated. 
Management believed that labor rates and other labor conditions 
the company's plant were equal or better than those found in 
similar plants in the area. Therefore, it was not anticipated 
that reaching an agreement with the union would present any 
major problems. There had not been any strikes, work stoppages 
or slowdowns of production; and none were forseen. 
To provide an employee incentive, the company established 
an Employee Savings Stock Purchase Program in which all employees 
could participate, including officers and directors. The program 
consisted of a savings fund plan and a retirement thrift plan. 
Classes under the program were formed at the beginning of each 
calendar year. Employees could enroll in either plan, providing 
they had at least one year of service with the company at the 
time of enrollment. Each employee could contribute up to ten 
percent of his salary, and the company contributed an amount 
equal to fifty percent of the employee's savings. The employee's 
savings and the company's contribution were turned over to a 
trustee-bank which invested one-half of the employee's savings 
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and the company's entire contribution in common stock of the 
company. The remaining half of the employee's savings was 
:placed in United States Government Series B Bonds. 
All classes under the savings fund plan matured on December 
31 of the fifth year following the year of formation. Savings 
and securities accumulated to that date are to be paid to the 
employee during the following January. 
Under the retirement thrift plan, all classes which had 
been in effect at least five years following formation matured 
when his employment terminated. If his employment terminated 
prior to completing five years of employment, the Employee 
received an amount equal to his savings contributions. 
CONCLUSIONS AND INSIGHTS 
The Lear Jet Corporation resulted from William P. Lear's 
desire to make a contribution to aviation through the develop- 
ment of a small executive jet aircraft. Lear was in a position 
very few men experience. He had the creative talent, initiative, 
financial capital and the courage to embark on a program which 
many industrial experts said "could never be done." 
At sixty, when most men are finalizing retirement plans, 
Lear was spending twelve to fifteen hours per day directing his 
aircraft development program. To Lear, money had no purpose 
unless it could be used to create a new product or improve one 
in existence. 
Although .possessing a keen mind and creative talent, Lear 
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had little use for a formal organizational structure and believed 
the only way to "get things done" was to personally supervise 
operations. 
He was a condemner of inter-office memos. In order to 
improve the internal communication, Lear had other management 
offices moved into a large room adjacent to his office. Lear 
said, "You would be surprised what this did for communication." 
Lear's importance to the company decreased as it continued 
to grow and assume the stature of a mature corporation. His 
designs and marketing policies, firmly implanted within the 
corporation, continued to function without Lear's personal 
supervision. But a problem which Lear appeared to disregard 
was the effect that his death could have had on the corporation. 
Lear's Vice-President and General Manager, William A. Sipprell 
would have been the most likely candidate to succeed Mr. Lear 
as President. However, Sipprell was experienced as an admin- 
istrator and not as an engineer. Many of the technical duties 
previously performed by Lear would, out of necessity, have 
been delegated to subordinates if Sipprell had become president. 
Lear may not have properly planned his aircraft development 
program prior to beginning design studies in Switzerland. Had 
he investigated the labor conditions in Switzerland, he would 
undoubtedly have discovered the low supply of skilled workers 
and the rather unique contract situation existant in Switzerland. 
Also, Lear could have requested Federal Aviation Agency certi- 
ication in Switzerland prior to beginning the development 
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program. Had this been done, he undoubtedly would not have 
started his program in Switzerland. 
Lc,Ir's persistent refusal to delegate authority caused much 
unrest among his immediate subordinates. The design engineers 
were allowed to make suggestions, but Lear reserved the authority 
for final approval. As a result, it was necessary for Lear to 
work many extra hours each day during the aircraft development 
program in order to supervise all operations. Many projects 
were delayed pending Lear's approval, and some projects were 
rushed through critical design and testing phases resulting in 
inferior cuality products and subsequent redesigning. 
Lear had acquired a reputation for designing and producing 
superior quality products from his many endeavors as an inventor - 
manufacturer. However, he also had a reputation for not pro- 
viding satisfactory post-sales service and replacement inventory. 
This was the primary reason Lear had not succeeded in selling 
his products to the commercial airlines. A Lear competitor once 
remarked, "If Lear would improve his service and increase his 
inventory stocks, he would put his competitors our of business." 
It appeared that Lear may have realized his weakness because 
he began offering a five hundred flight-hour factory warranty 
on the Lear Jet 23, .and also, prepared to furnish full main- 
tenance and replacement parts at the Wichita factory. 
Analysis of the financial statements shown in Exhibit 2 
reveals that as of july 31, 1964 the liquidity position of the 
Lear Jet Corporation was precarious. The current ratio of 1.0 
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was below the industry average of 1.75. A normally accepted 
acid test ratio is between 0.9 and 1.0, but Lear's was 0.4. The 
ratio of cash to total assets was 1.4%. The common stock equity 
ratio was twenty-six percent of total capitalization. Normal 
manufacturing industry standards for equity ratio were approxi- 
mately sixty percent of total capitalization. However, prior to 
November 30, 1964, Lear owned all outstanding capital stock and 
maintained an adequate cash balance by periodically loaning funds 
to the corporation. Lear had elected to use his personal funds 
for financing to the maximum extent possible rather than use 
debt capital until the corporation began profitable operations. 
The public stock offering of November 30, 1964 improved the 
capital structure of the Lear jet Corporation. The stock was 
sold to the public at a price of ten dollars per share, and on 
February 12, 1965 closed on the open market at seventeen dollars 
per share. 
As the Lear Stereo production was expanded, additional 
capital was required to finance increased inventories. With the 
common stock increasing in price, the company appeared to be in 
a favorable position to offer another public stock sale. 
Mr. Lear was an individual who was unafraid to risk his 
entire fortune developing a product that he believed was good. 
Lear had experienced failure along with success. But he was a 
true entreprenuer, a breed so rare in modern corporate life 
that President Johnson urged a national effort to revive it. 
With little use for traditional marketing surveys, Lear relied 
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on his part-intuitive, part-analytical sense in these matters. 
He credited most of his success to his ability to discern a 




LEAR JET CORPORATION 
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity 
1 
July 31, 1964 
(Dollar figures in thousands) 
ASSETS 
Current Assets: 
Cash $ 126 
Accounts receivable: 
Customers, less collection 
allowance of $2.5 $ 45 
City of Wichita 1,056 
Miscellaneous 11 
Inventories 
Raw materials and purchased parts $ 745 
Work in process 905 
Finished goods 10 
Prepaid' insurance and commissions 
Deposits with suppliers 
Total current assets 
Property 
Plant and office equipment $ 109 
Automotive equipment 28 
Aircraft 725 
Total $ 862 







Research and Development Costs- -Net $4, 728 
Excess Production Costs 262 
Long-Term Prepayments 82 
Organization Expense 3 
TOTAL ASSETS $8, 892 
1 Source: Lear Jet Corporation's financial statements. 
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LIABILITIES AND, STOCKHOLDER'S EQUITY 
Current Liabilities: 
Nc,tes Payable: 
Banks (cu:- nt maturities) $ 182 
Stockholder r 820 $1,002 
Accounts payable: 
Trade $ 952 
Due on conditional purchase contracts 185 
Withholding taxes & payroll deductions 48 
Other 23 $1,209 
Accruals: 
Salaries and wages $ 167 
Payroll and property takes 33 
Interest * 85 $ 285 
Deposits received on aircraft sales 499 
Total current liabilities $2,995 
Long-Term Notes Payable: 
Stockholder--5%, due Nov. 1, 1965 
Banks 
Total long-term notes payable... 
$0,085 
Stockholder's Equity: 
Capital Stock, $1 par value per share; 
authorized 3,000,000 share; issued & 
outstanding, 1,500,000 shares $1,500 
Paid-in surplus 308 
Retained earnings Nil 
Stockholder's ,Llity 






COMPARISON OF EXECUTIVE JET AIRCRAFT' 
Name Price Number of Cruising Range in Gross Number of Total 
Passengers eed 
(mph) 
Miles Weight Engines Thrust 
(incl.Crew) (Pounds) (Pounds) 
JET COMMANDER $770,000 8 490 1800 16,000 2 5700 
DeHAVILAND DH-125 790,000 8 ' 470 1520 20,500 2 6240 
SABRELINER 900,000 9 480 1750 18,650 2 6000 
JET STAR 1,600,000 10 500 2000 41,500 4 12000 
LEAR JET 23 595,000 8 530 1875 12,500 2 5700 
Airplane Manufacturer 
JET COMMANDER Aero Commander Division, Rockwell Standards 
DeHAVILAND DH-125 Hawker Siddeley Aviation, lAd. (England) 
SABRELINER North American Aviation, Inc. 
JET STAR Lockheed Aircraft Corporation 
LEAR JET 23 Leer Jet Corporation 
I 
Source, Respective Manufacturers 
36 
Exhibit 4 
ESTIMATED COST OF OPERATING LEAR JET 23 
PER FLIGHT HOUR AT SELECTED TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS 
FIXED COSTS 300 hrs./yr. 500 hrs./yr. 800 hrs./yr. 
Depreciation--7 year straight 
line to 40% residual value 
($51,000/yr.) $170.00 $102.00 $ 63.75 
Insurance 
Hull (2%) $11,500/yr 38.33 23.00 14.37 
Liability 1,476/yr 4.92 2.95 1.84 
Med. & Hosp. 180/yr .60 .36 .23 
Hangar 3,000/yr 10.00 6.00 3.74 
Misc. 5,000/yr 16.66 10.00 6.25 
TOTAL FIXED COSTS $240.51 $144.31 $ 90.18 
VARIABLE COSTS. 
Maintenance & Inspection 
1. Airframe & Engines 
a. Periodic Insp. (50 hrs. 
$5.00/hr--$250.00) 2.50 
b. 400 hr "Hot Section" 
2.50 2.50 
Total 50 man-hrs. @ $5.00 
/hr = $250.00 .63 .63 .63 
c. Routine Maintenance .85 .85 .35 
d. Other Equipment .38 .38 .32 
Total Main. & Insp $ 4.36 $ 4.36 $ 4.36 
Overhaul 
1. Engines (800 hrs TB0)* 45.00 45.00 45.00 
2. Other EquiT). (1200 hrs) 4.25 4.25 4.25 
3. Airframe .35 .35 .35 
Total Overhaul $ 49.60 $ 49.60 $ 49.60 
Fuel & Oil 
1. Fuel--200 gal/hr @ 27/gal. 54.00 54.00 54.00 
2. Oil--.8 gal/hr 1.30 1.30 1.30 
Total Fuel & Oil 55.30 $ 55.30 $ 55.30 
TOTAL VARIABLE COSTS $109.26 $109.26 $109.26 
TOTAL COST OF OPERATION** $349.77 $253.57 $191.44 
Block speed 450 mph 450 mph 450 mph 
Miles per year 135,000 225,000 360,000 
Cost per airplane mile $ .78 $ .56 $ .43 
*Includes estimated lease charges, etc. for loaner during 
overhaul. 
**Exclusive of crew costs. 






12 ft. 7 in. 
43 it. 3 in. 
Ir*-- 8 ft. 3 in. 
34 ft. 1 in. 
35 ft. 7 in. 
Exhibit 7 
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LEAR JET CORPORATION 
Wichita, Kansas 
Domestic Distributor 
CALIFORNIA AIRMOTIVE CORP. 
Mr. Allen E. Paulson, Pres. 
7139 Vineland 
North Hollywood, California 
W. F. LONG & ASSOCIATES 
Major W. F. Long, Pres. 
P.O. Box 35781 
Dallas, Texas 
AMERICAN LEAR JET, INC. 
Mr. Harry Barr, Pres. 
Municipal Airport 
Lincol:, Nebraska 
E=CUTIVE JET AIRWAYS 
Phillip Lovett, General Manager 
808 International Bldg. 
1319 F Street 
Washington, D. C. (Sales headquarters 
to be located at 
Columbus, Ohio) 
AIRKAMAN, INC. 
W. R. Miller, Pres. 
Bradley Field 
Windsor Locks, Connecticut 
ROBERT GRAF, INC. 
.1r. Robert Graf, Pres. 
2431 Barcelona Drive 
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 
Region 
Region 1: Washington, 
Oregon, Idaho, Nevada, 
California, Arizona, 
and Utah 
Region 2: Colorado, 
New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
Louisiana, Arkansas, 
and Texas 
Region 3: Nebraska, 
Wyoming, North and 
South Dakota, Kansas, 
Montana, Missouri, 
Minnesota, and Iowa 




Region 5: Pennsylvania, 
New Hampshire, New York, 
Massadhusetts, Maryland, 
West Virginia, Vermont, 
Rhode Island, New Jersey, 
Connecticut, and Maine 
Region 6: Tennessee, 
Mississippi, Virginia, 
Delaware, North and 
South Carolina, Florida, 
Alabama, and Georgia 
-oorr. 
Exhibit 7 cent. 
LEAR JET CORPORATION 
Wichita, Kansas 
EXECUTIVE AVIATION 
Mr. W. P. Lear, Jr., Pres. 
P.O. Box 18 
AeroDort Cointrin 
Geneva 15, Switzerland 
AVIANDES, S. A. 
Mr. Alejandro Orfilo, Pres. 
Garibaldi, 7-80 2iso 
Mendosa, Argentina 
INTERNATIONAL HELICOPTERS (AUST) 
PTY, LTD. 
Mr. J. A. L. Archer, Pres. 
10-14 Leicester St. 
Carlton, Victoria 
Australia 
HORIZONTE AERO. INTERNATIONAL C.A. 
Mr. Raymond Urquiza, Pres. 
P.O. Box 503 
Miami 43, Florida 
Region 
Europe, Africa, the 
Near and Middle East 
Central and South 
America, excluding 
Venezuela 





Makes every flight a pleasure 
...for you...for your passengers 
LEAR STEREO Cartridge Tape Player 
In the air or on the ground, the world's finest music-always interference free. 
Plug in a Lear 8-Track Stereo Tape Cartridge. Enjoy an hour and twenty minutes of high fidelity stereo music. 
Listen to news, sports, and special events on the AM radio. 
Unaffected by engine vibration or air turbulence. 
Operates independently of existing radio-navigational systems. 
EASY TO INSTALL, ANYWHERE. Weighs only 10 lbs. 
One complete package. Includes Lear Stereo Cartridge Tape Player (with stereo-headphone output jacks), Lear 
Stereo Speakers, AM radio and mounting hardware. 
Available in 12V or 24V DC models. 
Widest range of tape choices. Choose your favorites from the entire RCA record library of popular-classical-show 
music, etc. 
LEAR JET CORPORATION MUNICIPAL AIRPORT 
P.O. BOX 1280 WICHITA, KANSAS 
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The purpose of this study was to compile and present a 
business history of the Lear Jet Corporation. The material 
on which this study was based was obtained from Lear Jet Cor- 
poration records and interviews with representatives of manage- 
ment, designers, production specialists and customers. 
The Lear Jet Corporation was developed to design and 
produce an executive jet aircraft to be marketed in the United 
States. The sixty-two year old William P. Lear, Sr., _president 
and principal owner of the company, continued to depart from 
long-acceoted industrial maxims in the development of new 
products. His latest departure was a jet aircraft designed for 
corporate executives. Mr. Lear believed that executives utilize 
aircraft primarily to reduce travel time, and hence, do not 
require the large luxurious walk-around passenger cabins that 
are common in competitive models. He incorporated this utili- 
tarian concept into the design of the Lear Jet 23, and achieved 
speed and safety plus the utility and economy of a small air- 
craft. 
Another factor that "caused" the Lear Jet 23 to be built 
was that the increase in corporate mergers and diversification 
resulted in executives spending a greater proportion of their 
time in travel. A demand was thus created for a corporate air- 
craft capable of operating from small airports at jet airliner 
speeds. This was the market for which the Lear Jet 23 was 
designed. It was priced below all competitive models, and was 
better suited to the smaller corporation's budget. 
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A side product that resulted from the aircraft development 
program was the Lear Stereo that was designed to fit into a 
standard automobile radio compartment. The Lear Stereo design 
had been patented and was being tested by several major auto 
manufacturers as a new-car accessory item. It was expected to 
be included on twenty-five percent of the 1967 car models. 
Mr. Lear was the first man to develop and certify a jet 
aircraft entirely from private capital. As of November 30, 1964, 
he had invested $10,600,000 in the company, and owned all of 
the outstanding common stock. 
Mr. Lear experienced failure along with success. But he 
was a true entreprenuer, a breed so rare in modern corporate 
life that President Johnson urged a national effort to revive it. 
With little use for traditional marketing surveys, Lear relied 
on his part-intuitive, part-analytical sense in these matters. 
He credited most of his success to his ability to discern a 
market--before there was any proof that one existed. 
